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Modern warfare has witnessed the proliferation of coalition efforts to contain 
terrorism. To be successful, these efforts rely upon the effective integration of 
human and technological agents. Typically, models and analyses of network 
centric warfare (NCW) focus on technological aspects of a system, eschewing the 
roles, contributions and decisions made by humans. The Dynamic Model of 
Situated Cognition (DMSC) emerged as an attempt to represent relationships 
between technology and humans in a system.  The model has been applied in a 
variety of contexts: individual performance, military command and control, naval 
operations, human error in military mishaps, and, most recently, to modeling team 
behavior in complex organizations (Miller & Shattuck, 2004, 2005a, b; Shattuck 
& Miller, 2004, 2005; Miller, Shobe & Shattuck, 2005).  During the 2004 CCRT 
Symposium, we introduced “A Process Model of Situated Cognition in Military 
Command and Control.”  We have expanded and refined the model over the last 
two years and it continues to be well received. In this paper, we review these 
changes and extend the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition to serve as an aid 
for system designers as they consider how individual and team behaviors emerge 




The enormous advantages expected to accompany Network Centric Warfare (NCW) have not yet 
been realized (Cebrowski & Garstka, 1998). Reliance upon advanced technology has thus far 
failed to defeat an agile and illusive enemy in the asymmetric warfare waged now in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  It appears that the post 9/11 War on Terror combat models employed by the 
Department of Defense (DoD) have not yielded their predicted results, leaving strategists and 
politicians wondering how to improve them.  These models may be inaccurate, incomplete, or 
flawed.  Perhaps part of the reason for the disappointing results of our combat models is their 
incapability to represent the entirety of an NCW organization, including both the humans and the 
technological components which comprise any complex system.  Failure to address the human 
side of the equation will result in inaccurate predictions.  Such inaccuracy was evident in the first 
week of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) when the inability of the humans in the system to 
operate 24-7 was not considered in the initial ground war calculations.  The fierce dust storms 
that arose a few days into the operation provided much needed rest for the U.S. forces.  In 
addition to addressing both humans and technology, a strong model must be dynamic, 
representing the way in which natural processes occur, mirroring the ebb and flow of information 
and entities on the battlefield.   
 
In 2003, we introduced the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition (DMSC) which differs from 
other models in that it assumes a dynamic process and examines the roles of both humans and 
technology and the interplay between them.  Since its introduction, we have continued to 
improve the model, presenting it to various groups who have received it favorably.  We have 
incorporated their comments and suggestions, adding to its utility. The model started as a 
simplistic representation of a single individual’s viewpoint but it has now developed to represent 
the process by which a commander or even a team acquires information needed to assess a 
situation and make decisions.  The model has recently been used by researchers of the DARPA 
M&D C2 Experiment 7 in their human-in-the-loop simulations, using it to determine how and 
why events, with both positive and negative outcomes, have occurred.  It is currently being used 
in a series of field experiments at the Naval Postgraduate School to demonstrate how various 
data elements travel throughout the battle space, arriving in the command and control center, 




Review of the model circa 2004 
 
The model sprang from a command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) war game conducted at FT Knox in the Army’s Unit 
of Action Mounted Battle Laboratory (UAMBL). It was an attempt to define a common 
framework with which groups of operations research analysts and human factors engineers could 
communicate effectively.  Situation awareness or “SA” was a term invoked by both groups of 
researchers but it was clear that the two groups defined the term differently. Human factors 
researchers described SA as something that resulted from human cognition, (that is, SA resides 
in the human at all times, with varying levels of accuracy), whereas the operations analysts used 
the term to describe the number of red forces, for instance, that had been discovered by their 
technological sensors.  To further muddy the waters, the US Army had begun using the term 
“Situational Understanding” to refer to an advanced level of SA, analogous to Endsley’s Levels 
2 & 3 SA in the scientific literature (Endsley, 2000).  The two groups of researchers attempted to 
arrive at a shared understanding of events in the scenarios which were being simulated but each 
failed to appreciate the other perspective’s significance and contribution.  Hence, the model was 
created to illustrate the role played by humans and technology, demonstrating that appropriate 
consideration of both humans and technology is necessary to understand the process by which an 
event unfolds. 
 
As first conceptualized, the DMSC was introduced as a series of six ovals of varying sizes and 
three lenses (see Figure 1).  The three ovals on the left side of the model (1, 2 and 3) represent 
the technological side of the system while the three ovals on the right (4, 5 and 6) represent the 
human perceptual and cognitive processes.  Oval 1 is ground truth and in the simulated 
laboratory scenarios where it was first used, contains all the data from enemy, friendly and 
neutral forces as well as terrain features and the location of all sensors.  In the simulation, Oval 2 
is always a subset of Oval 1, including only those things that are detected by sensor systems.   
 
 
Figure 1.  Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition 
 
Oval 3 represents the subset of information that is displayed on the command and control screens 
of the individual operator.  Oval 3 will vary depending on the settings of each screen and may 
change multiple times over the course of a scenario as an operator makes adjustments to features 
such as field of view, map resolution or range rings. Ovals 4, 5 and 6 on the right side of the 
model represent the perception of data elements, the comprehension of the current situation 
(sometimes called a mental model) and the individual’s projection of current events into the 
future.  These three ovals correspond to situational awareness Levels 1, 2, and 3 in the scientific 
literature (Endsley, 2000).  When the model was first introduced as a tool to assist in 
understanding laboratory simulations of military scenarios, the three lenses (A, B, and C) 
consisted of only four things: the local situation, the military operational order (OPORD), 
military doctrine, and the experience of the operator.  
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There was an acknowledgement that distortions in the lens could result in inaccurate perceptions 
(Oval 4), comprehensions, (Oval 5), or projections (Oval 6).  Such a distortion is illustrated in 
Figure 2.   It was recognized that once inaccurate data were accepted into any stage of the model, 
this inaccuracy would be propagated throughout the remaining ovals, leading to inaccurate 









Changes to the model since its introduction 
 
In the time since its initial introduction, the DMSC has changed, in many cases expanding to 
reflect the comments and observations of the audiences and our own observations when we 
applied it in different venues.  The composition of the lenses has changed to include the 
individual’s indwelling traits (e.g., intellect or personality) and temporary states (e.g., fatigue or 
fear), further emphasizing the dynamic, continuously changing nature of the lenses as well as the 
ovals.  
 
There have also been changes to the sources of uncertainty in the model with the recognition that 
Oval 1, ground truth, is completely accurate while it is also constantly being updated.  However, 
at a given point in time, Oval 1 will be identical for any and all individuals involved.  
Inaccuracies can enter the model at any point after Oval 1 and once inside the model, may 
propagate throughout it with unexpected or even disastrous outcomes (see the example of the 
USS Greeneville in Miller, Shobe & Shattuck, 2005).  Data may also be morphed incorrectly 
based on erroneous algorithms, also misleading decision makers or giving them a false 
confidence in the accuracy of the data they are viewing.  Spoofing, or active efforts by the enemy 
to mislead, appears as inaccuracy in Oval 2.  For example, the red force has a single tank 
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positioned in friendly territory but has three decoys also positioned nearby.  Ground truth would 
indicate one enemy tank and three decoys.  If the decoys are sufficiently realistic and can deceive 
the sensor systems, Oval 2 would indicate four enemy tanks.  This misinformation would 
continue to propagate throughout the model.  
 
The relationship between accuracy and certainly has also been explored in another expansion to 
the model (Miller & Shattuck, 2005b).  An individual needs to have both a high level of certainty 
and a high degree of accuracy to have the best possible comprehension and projection (Ovals 5 
and 6).  In the worst case, an individual would feel certain but would be wrong. Figure 3 shows a 
matrix with the relationship between accuracy and certainty, also showing a representation of 
Oval 5 with each of the four conditions.  In the matrix, a high level of accuracy (condition B or 



















Figure 3. Matrix of accuracy and certainty as it applies to the model 
 
 
Feedback loops have been introduced to better illustrate the dynamic nature of the model.  These 
feedback loops are seen in Figures 4 and 5.  In Figure 4, they feed from Ovals 5 and 6 to the 
preceding ovals (Ovals 1 through 4).  To some extent, these feedback loops represent decisions 
made by individuals.  Examples of such decisions may include repositioning their forces, 
changing the sensor coverage, adjusting the C2 screens, or shifting their focus from one portion 
of the battlefield to another.  These feedback loops or decisions emanate from a human operator 
whose comprehension (Oval 5) or projection into the future (Oval 6) compels them to take 
action.  These feedback loops happen continuously and can be observed directly by watching the 
operator’s actions and by listening to the communications with other individuals.    
 
Figure 4. Feedback Loops in the Model from Ovals 5 and 6 to Ovals 1 through 4 
 
The feedback loops seen in Figure 5 represent adjustments or accommodations to the lenses.  
Comprehensions and projections serve to alter the lenses. 
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We have also explored how the DMSC applies to teams.  When extending the model from 
individuals to teams, Ovals 1 and 2 are the same for all team members but Ovals 3 through 6 
differ among the individual members of the team. Figure 6 illustrates this idea of a common Oval 
1 and 2 and diverging Ovals 3 through 6.  This finding assumes that information in Ovals 1 and 2 
is shared equally by all team members.  In a situation involving diverse coalition partners, it is 
possible to imagine a scenario in which Oval 1 is identical for all members, but intelligence 
information is not shared equally among all partners.  In that case, Oval 2 would show 
divergence between coalition partners. 
 
 
Figure 6. The DMSC applied to teams 
 
 
Figure 7 represents how information received from other humans is assimilated into the human 
side of the DMSC.  The information may be a perception (“I just spotted enemy combatants 
moving through the northern corridor”), it may be a comprehension (“I just saw a bunch of 
civilians running toward the embassy and the patrol in that area is reporting a lot of shouting. I 
think we have an angry mob on our hands”), or it may be a projection (“I saw men digging at the 
side of this road.  I believe they may be setting up an ambush for our convoy”).  The human 
information is first filtered through Lens A and only then may enter Ovals 4 through 6.  
Depending on what is known about the human who is supplying the data, the input may be 
accepted (“Yeah, Joe always know what he’s talking about.  I’ll do exactly as he requests.”) or it 
may be rejected (“Dave is always jumping to the wrong conclusions—and it usually gets us in 
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Figure 7. Input from humans enters the DMSC at Lens A 
 
 
Applications of the model 
 
Since its introduction in a laboratory-based military simulation, the model has been used by the 
authors in a variety of military applications.  In the field of error analysis, it has been applied to 
the USS Stark incident (Miller & Shattuck, 2004), and to the mishap involving collision of the 
USS Greeneville, a US Navy Submarine, and a Japanese fishing vessel, the Ehime Maru (Miller, 
Shobe & Shattuck, 2005).  In the USS Greeneville example, the information available to the crew 
members was modeled using the DMSC providing insight into the decisions made by the captain 
of the submarine.  In another submarine mishap, the USS Hartford ran aground off the coast of 
Italy, causing millions of dollars in damage (Miller, Shobe & Shattuck, 2005).  In January 2005, 
the nuclear-powered USS San Francisco collided with an uncharted undersea mountain,  
providing yet another example of a mishap involving a US Navy submarine whose crew was 
unaware of inaccuracies of data in Ovals 2 and 3, leading to erroneous comprehensions (Oval 5) 
and projections (Oval 6). 
 
The model has also been used to assess how information flows among members of a team in a 
complex organization (Shattuck & Miller, 2005). The authors build on Naturalistic Decision 
Making (NDM) theories and use an actual military accident to trace the flow of information 
through the model, highlighting what decisions were made, how the decisions were made, and 
how the technological and human aspects of the system conspired to cause the accident.  Thus, 
the model couples NDM theory with the DMSC model to provide a more robust insight into total 
system performance.  
 
Lastly, we used have the model to provide developers of network centric operations and warfare 
systems (Miller & Shattuck, 2005b) with user-centered design principles.  In that paper, we 
described Network Centric Warfare and introduced the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition to 
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serve as a design aid for developers who need to consider how individual and team behaviors 
emerge and interact with complex technology in a system context. Understanding how the 
components of these complex systems are integrated and designing robust and effective networks 
is vital if NCW is to succeed.  The DMSC can be used to optimize total human system 
performance by forecasting excessively high workloads for an individual, potentially shifting 





The changes and enhancements to the Dynamic Model of Situated Cognition make it a robust 
tool to assist in post hoc event analysis and predictive modeling efforts of complex systems such 
as network centric warfare.  It has shown its usefulness in a variety of venues, both laboratory 
and field-based, as well as providing a predictive and retrospective tool for examining system 
strengths and weaknesses.  It has been adopted by professionals in the field of combat modeling 
and continues to aid systems designers.  Failure to adopt a dynamic and comprehensive model 
such as the DMSC may lead to inaccurate assessment of events or poorly designed systems. As 
seen with previous attempts to predict combat outcomes, inaccuracies can lead to disappointing 
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